💸 Vote Buying: Costs vs Benefits
Understand the economics that prevent governance attacks
Experience a fairer voting mechanism
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0 / 5 completed💰 The Vote Buying Paradox
Here's quadratic voting's dark secret: while it resists whales, it makes vote buying more attractive. In linear voting (1 token = 1 vote), buying votes from someone costs you exactly what they paid. In quadratic voting, buying votes from small holders is cheaper than accumulating tokens yourself. Why? Because small holders have higher efficiency. Someone with 100 tokens has 10 votes (10% efficiency). Someone with 10,000 tokens has 100 votes (1% efficiency). Buying from the 100-token holder is 10x more efficient than self-accumulation. This creates perverse incentives.
🎮 Interactive: Vote Buying Cost Calculator
Calculate the cost of acquiring votes through token accumulation vs vote buying from smaller holders. See why quadratic voting makes delegation and vote buying economically rational.
At your token level (1,000), self-accumulation costs 131.6 tokens per vote. Buying votes from small holders costs ~10 tokens per vote. Quadratic voting makes delegation and vote markets economically efficient. This isn't a bug—it's mathematical reality. Small holders have higher vote-to-token ratios, making their votes valuable to large holders.
📈 Comparison with Linear Voting
In linear voting, vote buying offers no advantage (1 token = 1 vote regardless of who holds it). In quadratic voting, vote efficiency varies by holder size, creating arbitrage opportunities.
⚠️ The Vote Buying Problem
Small holders can profit by delegating/selling votes to large holders. If a whale needs 100 more votes, they can offer small holders $10 per vote (worth $100 in tokens for the whale via self-accumulation, but only $10 cost to the small holder). Both parties benefit.
An attacker can split 10,000 tokens across 100 wallets (100 tokens each). Instead of 100 votes (√10,000), they get 1,000 votes (100 × √100). 10x voting power through fragmentation. Quadratic voting amplifies sybil attacks if identity isn't verified.
Multiple whales can coordinate: instead of each buying tokens individually (expensive), they pool funds and distribute across many wallets. Collective sybil attack. Hard to detect without identity verification.
Delegation (not bribery) can be positive: small holders delegate to informed voters, improving governance quality. The problem is undisclosed delegation and pay-to-vote schemes. Transparent delegation (like snapshot.org) is legitimate.
🛡️ Mitigations
Require proof of unique identity (BrightID, Proof of Humanity, ENS + GitcoinPassport). Prevents sybil attacks by limiting one vote-account per person. Trade-off: privacy loss.
Combine quadratic voting with time locks: votes = √(tokens × days held). Recent token transfers have reduced power. Blocks last-minute manipulation.
Allow delegation but make it public and revocable. Voters see who delegates to whom. Enables accountability without blocking legitimate representation.
Minimal Anti-Collusion Infrastructure uses zero-knowledge proofs to prevent vote buying. Voters can change votes privately, making bribes unenforceable.
💡 Key Insight
Quadratic voting creates a fundamental trade-off: it resists whale dominance but enables vote buying. In linear voting, vote buying is economically neutral (buying someone's 100 tokens gives you 100 votes, same as if you bought tokens yourself). In quadratic voting, buying votes from small holders is cheaper than self-accumulation due to efficiency differences. This isn't a flaw you can fix—it's mathematical reality. Solutions require identity verification, time-weighting, or cryptographic collusion resistance. Choose your poison: whale tyranny (linear) or vote-buying markets (quadratic). Most DAOs pick quadratic + identity verification as the lesser evil.